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INTRODUCTION
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK, PAUL HORWITZ, & CHAD OLDFATHER*
For almost entirely forgivable reasons, most legal academic symposia
remind one of the adage—surely well known among the editors, if not the
readers, of a Wisconsin-based law review—about the weather: Everyone talks
about it, but no one does anything about it.
Symposia have been accused of various standard flaws. High on the list are
the related criticisms that they are overstocked with “Famous People,”1 and that
they neglect or ignore “promising newcomers, mavericks, women[,] and
minorities.”2 These are important criticisms, which we at least tried to address
in our own symposium planning. (Whether we succeeded or not is surely up to
others to judge.)3
Beyond these standard criticisms, there is a broader concern with the
symposium format: that it consists of a group of people who meet on common
ground in order to wander far afield in every possible direction. George
Bernard Shaw called England and America “two countries divided by a

* Conference organizers, respectively: Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland “Buck” Ransdell, Jr.
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; Gordon Rosen
Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor
of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Solon, The Symposium, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 136, 136 (1998).
2. Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium Issue: Community of Meaning or Re-Inscription
of Hierarchy?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 670–72 (1992).
3. We certainly did not fail to avoid inviting at least a couple of “Famous People.” Of course,
we did so because we thought they had valuable things to say despite the misfortune of being well
known. We were also old enough hands at symposium planning to be aware that the presence of a
confirmed Famous Person or two will make other acceptances easier. There is another, less selfish
reason to do so: if one conscientiously attempts to invite interesting and talented people from a variety
of schools and backgrounds, emphatically including young and rising scholars, it is gratifying to give
them the opportunity to meet and learn from—and teach—those established figures.
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common language.”4 Had Shaw been forced to attend a law review symposium,
he might have called it a collection of scholars divided by a common topic.
One can learn much, of course, from a variety of views on and approaches
to a particular subject or question. But variety can enervate as well as inspire.
A symposium that “range[s] widely over a bewildering variety of issues,”5
however tenuously tied they may be to an ostensible unifying topic, can leave
one, well, bewildered, even as to what the topic was in the first place. And
although the minds collected there are all supposed to direct their efforts at
exploring the same problem, it is relatively rare that they combine forces to
arrive at a common resolution, or even statement, of that problem. Often
enough, each has his or her own goal to pursue—one that resembles
suspiciously the goals pursued in past or forthcoming articles—and mutual
learning and consensus are incidental, if they happen at all. That is perhaps
somewhat surprising, given the normative bent of so much legal scholarship.
But the frequent result is not terribly surprising: “a rather low signal-to-noise
ratio” in the contents of the symposium.6
In this case, the symposium planners had a different goal in mind: to
actually arrive at some common, generally agreed upon answers and principles.
With the wonderfully collegial collaboration—but not, to be sure, complete
agreement on every issue—of the symposium participants, and the kind
assistance of the editors of the Marquette Law Review and their willingness to
do the unusual, we have done just that here.
It helps that the subject of this symposium—the ethics of legal
scholarship—is one as to which there is widespread agreement that all is not
well. Not all of this consensus necessarily reaches the “outside” world. The
legal academy, like any other branch of the academy, can be defensive. When
academics generally are, or are perceived to be, under assault from outside (and
sometimes internal) forces,7 it is unsurprising that the pages of the Chronicle of
4. See CHRISTOPHER E. DAVIES, DIVIDED BY A COMMON LANGUAGE: A GUIDE TO BRITISH AND
AMERICAN ENGLISH, at viii (2005).
5. William Twining, The Boston Symposium: A Comment, 66 B.U. L. REV. 391, 391 (1986).
6. Solon, supra note 1, at 136.
7. For a mere sampling of sources, see FRANK DONOGHUE, THE LAST PROFESSORS: THE
CORPORATE UNIVERSITY AND THE FATE OF THE HUMANITIES (2008); BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE
FALL OF THE FACULTY: THE RISE OF THE ALL-ADMINISTRATIVE UNIVERSITY AND WHY IT MATTERS
(2013); HENRY A. GIROUX, NEOLIBERALISM’S WAR ON HIGHER EDUCATION (2014); CHRISTOPHER
NEWFIELD, UNMAKING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: THE FORTY-YEAR ASSAULT ON THE MIDDLE
CLASS (2011); ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION: CORPORATIZATION, THE
ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010). There are
at least as many books arguing that the university’s wounds are largely self-inflicted as there are those
arguing that it is under assault from neoliberal or other forces. See, e.g., RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA
ROKSA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES (2011); WILLIAM
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Higher Education and of an equally endless number of books are filled with
defenses of what we do,8 and serve as the launching point for a barrage of
arrows pointed anywhere else but at ourselves. When law schools are
surrounded (and inhabited by) critics,9 it is unsurprising that they too will have
their ardent defenders.10 Similarly, although law professors have worried about
the state of legal scholarship for as long as legal scholarship has existed,11 when
those criticisms come from the outside12 our colleagues can be relied upon to
rally ‘round the flag.13
The same is true for the ethics of legal scholarship. Even if—as we think—
there is a fairly broad consensus among legal scholars themselves that we either
behave imperfectly as ethical actors when engaging in legal scholarship or lack
clear guidance for what it means to act ethically, or both, legal academics may
be unwilling to say so outside faculty lounges, private chats in offices, and other
DERESCIEWICZ, EXCELLENT SHEEP: THE MISEDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN ELITE AND THE WAY TO
A MEANINGFUL LIFE (2014); LAURA KIPNIS, UNWANTED ADVANCES: SEXUAL PARANOIA COMES TO
CAMPUS (2017); GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF
AMERICAN DEBATE (2012).
8. See, e.g., MARTHA S. NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE
HUMANITIES (updated ed. 2016); MICHAEL S. ROTH, BEYOND THE UNIVERSITY: WHY LIBERAL
EDUCATION MATTERS (2014); FAREED ZAKARIA, IN DEFENSE OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION (2015);
RANDALL STROSS, A PRACTICAL EDUCATION: WHY LIBERAL ARTS MAJORS MAKE GREAT
EMPLOYEES (2017).
9. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW S CHOOLS (2012).
10. See, e.g., Philip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 387 (2013); Jay Sterling Silver, The Case Against Tamanaha’s Motel 6 Model
of Legal Education, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 50 (2012); Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre,
Populist Outrage, Reckless Empirics: A Review of Failing Law Schools, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
176 (2014).
11. The locus classicus is Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
Citations to various articles and symposia addressing and generally lamenting legal scholarship can be
found in Deborah Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327–28 nn.3–8 (2002). A
more recent, pungent critique, followed by various responses, is Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence,
Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J.
803 (2009).
12. See Tamara R. Piety, In Praise of Legal Scholarship, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 801, 801
nn.1–2 (2017) (citing recent examples, including Chief Justice Roberts’s now-famous quote: “Pick up
a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of
Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was
of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar”). For a definitive
treatment of Chief Justice Roberts’s then-hypothetical topic, see Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of
Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015).
13. See, e.g., Piety, supra note 12; Silver, supra note 10, at 54 (“[L]egal scholarship enriches
teaching as it refines the practice of law and advances justice . . . .”); Michael C. Dorf, Richard A.
Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 186, 190–93 (2016)
(book review).
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safe spaces. Some, tenured or not, may refrain from saying so publicly for
prudential or self-preservative reasons. Others may do so because they are
untenured (or “pre-tenured,” as the telling current phrase runs), and unwilling
to question the scholarly ethics of those who will vote on their future
employment—or of the kinds of articles they write to win promotion and tenure.
Others are either too busy or too little inclined to engage in meta-scholarship of
this sort, occupied as they are with doing scholarship itself.
And there is another reputational factor, one not unrelated to the very
problems addressed here. Prestige attaches to placement in top law reviews.
Success at that “game” involves appealing to the student editors of elite law
reviews. And the very practice of student-edited law reviews is one of the
factors identified by many law professors as giving rise to concerns about the
ethics of legal scholarship in the first place.
For these reasons, the actual corpus of legal scholarship, including legal
scholarship about legal scholarship, may not fully reflect the depth and breadth
of the legal academy’s concerns with the ethics of legal scholarship. But the
concern is there just the same. It shows up explicitly from time to time in the
legal academic literature.14 It appears, in slightly obscured form, in discussions
and debates about legal scholarly standards.15 And it shows up frequently in
the many public forums to which law professors have decamped in great
numbers: blogs, social media such as Facebook and Twitter, and so on.16
Indeed, the existence and popularity of social media, for law professors as
for others, is itself not only a place to discuss concerns over the ethics of legal
scholarship, but a cause of the growing interest in and concern over the subject.
Twitter, among other prominent social media, is “awash with law professors
proffering legal opinions” on hot-button issues.17 Legal blogs may have slowed
down, both in terms of the content they produce and in terms of the number of
new blogs created, as other social media supersede the blog in popularity, but
14. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Messerschmidt and Convergence in Action: A Reply to
Comments on Trawling for Herring, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 119 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986);
Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and “White Male” Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991); Mark S. Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81
GEO. L.J. 251 (1992).
16. At least two of the authors of this Introduction have bored literally dozens of their “followers”
with Twitter posts on the subject.
17. Karen Sloan, For Law Profs, Beware the Perils of Twitter, LAW.COM (Jan. 16, 2018, 2:40
PM),
https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2018/01/11/for-law-profs-beware-the-perils-oftwitter/?slreturn=20180021083304 [https://perma.cc/D3RT-648U]; accord Noah Feldman, Twitter’s
Not a Great Place for Legal Advice, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:19 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-16/twitter-s-not-a-great-place-for-legal-advice
[https://perma.cc/TV3R-XR49].
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there remain large numbers of blogs on which legal academics opine on legal
and political issues. The election of President Trump has contributed to the
creation of at least one more such blog.18 There are also social media platforms,
less visible to the public but often with substantial readerships, in which law
professors similarly opine on the concerns of the day. Alongside pictures of
one’s cat or children, many law professors’ Facebook feeds are full of “hot
takes” on legal issues. And although the practice of law professors writing opeds is an old one, it increasingly takes on the nature and reach of social media
as those op-eds appear in online publications such as Slate or The Huffington
Post, and as newspapers such as The New York Times and The Wall Street
Journal become more and more a part of the social media environment: not so
much print papers with an online presence, as online presences with vestigial
print versions, whose business model and very architecture encourages
“sharing” and commenting on their contents.
These are the newest but not the only platforms in which law professors
have, depending on one’s viewpoint, supplemented, extended, or distorted their
missions as scholars. “[L]aw professors’ letter[s]” have, since at least the
impeachment of President Clinton and the 2000 election controversy, been an
increasingly popular means of reaching and attempting to influence decisionmakers and the public.19 Similarly, as the overall number of amicus briefs
before various courts increases, the so-called “scholars’ brief[]” has become an
increasingly common and visible vehicle for law professors to attempt through
extra-scholarly work to influence courts (and others).20
All these sources for the propagation of law professors’ opinions are not
truly separate categories, and the simultaneous rise in the quantity and visibility
of their use is not coincidental. Almost a decade ago, after the rise of legal
blogs, scholars’ letters, and other vehicles, but before the full flowering of
social media, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky wrote about the difficulty of “draw[ing]
a distinction” between different forms of writing by law professors “based just
18. That is the Take Care Blog, whose general mission of providing “insightful, accessible, and
timely legal analysis of the President’s adherence” to the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed” was “undertake[n] . . . in direct response to recent assaults on the rule of law in America by
President Donald J. Trump and his Administration.”
About Us, TAKE CARE BLOG ,
https://takecareblog.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/9H9W-7S6Y] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
19. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual
Capital From the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13, 16 (2001); accord Neal
Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 165 (1999); Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other Institutional
Implications of the Clinton Scandals, 60 MD. L. REV. 59, 93–95 (2001).
20. For a dialogue on the issue, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of
a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 223 (2012); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Scholars’ Briefs: A
Response to Richard Fallon, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 135 (2013).
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on form.”21 Although he doubted that all such writings met the criteria for legal
scholarship, he added, “I find it hard to explain why an amicus brief containing
lengthy and original analysis of a legal issue does not count as scholarship, but
that same brief repackaged and published as a law review article is deemed
scholarship.”22
The word “repackaged,” with its suggestion that what we see is merely the
same content appearing on different “platforms,” is key to understanding how
and why these varied expressions of law professors’ views have given rise to
renewed concern and discussion of the ethics of legal scholarship. It is certainly
a plausible enough argument that the platform for a piece of legal scholarship
is not its essential feature. But each of these platforms may involve or
encourage different forms of writing, different motivations for writing, and
different constraints—or lack of constraint—on the content of the writing. The
long timeline and (somewhat) careful vetting of scholars’ writing in some
platforms encourages one type of writing. The seeming privacy of other
platforms, such as Facebook, may encourage other forms of writing, perhaps
more naked in their motivations and expressions. The immediacy of platforms
like Twitter, which both contain and incentivize hot takes, hot responses from
readers, and hot replies from the author, may result in still another form of
writing. Taken together, they raise important questions about the nature of legal
scholarship and the duties and constraints of legal scholars writing as such.
Finally, the multi-platform nature of legal scholars’ writing on legal
issues—the “repackaging,” as Chemerinsky puts it, of roughly the same
subjects and arguments in potentially very different forms and for different
audiences—raises questions about the ethics of legal scholarship because it can
be, and often is, an integrated enterprise. For some, that may be merely a matter
of seeking the widest possible distribution of the ideas contained within a law
review article or a body of scholarship. For an overlapping set of law
professors, the integrated nature of this writing may contribute to a branding
effort aimed at professional advancement of various sorts.23

21. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 892 (2009).
22. Id.
23. Brian Leiter, SSRN Download Rankings Now Measure Mentions in Newspaper, LAW
PROFESSORS BLOG NETWORK (Jan. 8, 2018), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2018/01/ssrndownload-rankings-now-measure-mentions-in-newspapers.html [https://perma.cc/7DZU-J8TG]. As
Brian Leiter recently noted (with dismay), the “download rankings” of the Social Science Research
Network (SSRN), which has become the primary source of access to legal scholarship for many law
professors and whose rankings are a subject of often obsessive concern by law professors themselves,
are heavily influenced by newspaper mentions of particular articles appearing on SSRN, which can,
via hyperlinks to the online version of a news story, lead to tens of thousands of additional downloads.
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For others, these platforms—including one’s law review articles, books, or
other traditional forums for scholarship—are all the same because the goal in
each case is fundamentally the same. That goal, in a word, is “engagement.”
“Engaged scholarship” entails the view that beyond “our romance with
‘serious’ scholarship,” we must seek forms of scholarship that have “a real
world impact and a broader audience than the typical law professor, law
student, or legal scholar.”24 We must be “actively involved in the world of [our]
subject matter,”25 seeking actively “to influence or shape the law itself, rather
than [merely] comment on its status.”26 As Rebecca Eisenberg has observed,
“The tension between the role of advocate and the role of scholar may be less
apparent to legal scholars, who are trained as advocates and who often take
something like an advocate’s stance in their scholarly writing.”27 Modern
advocates of “engaged scholarship” may acknowledge this tension, but insist
that engaged scholarship is valuable and should be embraced by law professors.
Given that view, and especially the position that we should seek an impact
on a wider audience than ourselves, there is a close link between this approach
and the view that “we need to broaden our [use and sense of the] value of other
types of publications [besides traditional law reviews and university press
books] . . . , and embrace other forms of nontraditional scholarship” that have
a wider readership and impact.28 On this view, the use of Twitter, Facebook,
and other forms of social media, scholars’ letters and briefs, op-eds, and other
nontraditional forms of scholarship is not simply an attempt to communicate
casually with one’s friends, publicize an idea, or engage in brand-building and
self-promotion. The use of these varied media and of different kinds of writing
is an integral part of the enterprise of “engaged” scholarship itself. These
practices are given a push not only by the popularity of these media, but by the
highly political—some would say urgently political—times in which we live,
an era of fierce political debate and activism that takes place largely on these
media. Although, since the rise of modernity if not before, it has been a
common belief in every moment, in every era, that this moment is special, that

Id. Law professors, we venture to suggest, do not always pay sufficient attention to the means of
production and distribution of their scholarship and its possible effects on their scholarship.
24. Sonia K. Katyal, Encouraging Engaged Scholarship: Perspectives From an Associate Dean
for Research, 31 TOURO L. REV. 53, 54–56 (2014).
25. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Engaged Scholarship as Method and Vocation, 22 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 193, 203 (2010).
26. David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One:
Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 761, 765 (2005).
27. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Scholar as Advocate, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 391, 394 (1993).
28. Katyal, supra note 24, at 54.
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this era calls for more engagement, there is no doubt that legal scholars in the
current moment again believe that there are new and special reasons for them
to be more “engaged.”
Our aim here is not to criticize this view, or the use of varied platforms and
communicative approaches and styles to reach wider audiences. Some—
including some among the symposium participants—have criticized it, or
expressed concerns about it. Others among the participants in this symposium
have argued—thoughtfully and well—that “[i]f we want to use the law to
further the ends of justice, we . . . need big, ambitious scholarship that is
unabashedly normative.”29 The participants in this symposium included
conventional legal scholars, interdisciplinary legal scholars, and even one nonlawyer (Stanley Fish) who writes frequently about law, legal scholarship, and
the academy in general. Their methods differ, and so do their views on the
function and goals of legal scholarship, on speech by academics outside the
usual precincts of scholarly journals and books, on specific behavior by legal
academics, and much else besides. While respecting those differences, the
document put together through discussion at the symposium event and
published in this issue constitutes an effort to reach as much common ground
and consensus as we can on a set of what we call basic “principles of scholarly
ethics” for law professors.30
Like most such ethical guides, whether for academics, professionals, or
others, these basic principles are necessarily general in form. They comprise a
short list of basic norms—exhaustiveness, sincerity and good faith, candor,
open-mindedness, and disclosure—that can guide legal scholars with a variety
of viewpoints, including varied viewpoints about the point of scholarship itself;
a variety of methods or approaches to legal scholarly work; and work performed
through a variety of forums or “platforms.” They are not wholly general. As
with many professional ethical codes, and as with legal Restatements—
although the draft principles published here are neither, nor are they intended
to be—the basic principles are filled out somewhat by explanation, discussion,
and some fairly basic applications. But neither do they “partake of the prolixity
of a legal code.”31
What, then, is their value? We think that designing this symposium around
the effort to come up with a concrete and written set of proposed principles of
legal scholarly ethics, general though they may be, makes at least three
important contributions. First, if we succeeded in inviting and creating a
29. Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 6, 17
(2016). See generally ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION (2011).
30. See Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 897 (2018).
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
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discussion among a diverse set of scholars who, though united by an interest in
these questions, take different views on them, then the fact of reasonable
consensus on these principles has value in itself. It suggests that despite the
apparent dissatisfaction with or concern about the contemporary state of legal
scholarly ethics, there are common principles around which a diverse group of
scholars can unite.
A second and related value has to do precisely with the fact that the
individual members of the group that came up with these draft principles do
differ in their views, methodologies, perspectives on the purpose of legal
scholarship, and more. That they reached some consensus around these basic
principles suggests that at least some core values are shared by legal scholars
whose work itself may differ considerably. These principles are thus not simply
an effort to draw a narrow line around some strict definition of legal scholarship
or scholarly ethics and disclaim those who fall outside those narrow boundaries.
This is not a normative point: whether legal scholarship should be so defined,
and whether some work by law professors should not count as “legal
scholarship” as such, is itself something legal scholars, including those
participating in this symposium, may wish to debate. Instead, we suggest that
a wide variety of law professors may find these core principles useful in judging
the work of others—and, perhaps more important, in writing and reflecting on
their own scholarship.
It is thus unsurprising that these draft principles focus, in one form or
another, on openness and transparency. That is transparently true, so to speak,
of some, such as the principles of candor and disclosure. But it is, in the end,
true of all of them. The principle of exhaustiveness, for example, does not
speak in direct terms to the question of transparency. But a duty to
“acknowledge” and “engage” with “pertinent past work” on the topic on which
one is writing enables readers to evaluate that piece of writing against the
backdrop of other work,32 from a variety of perspectives and methods,
addressing the same subject. (Not incidentally, it also forces the writer him- or
herself to confront that work.) In each case, these principles, applied carefully
and in good faith, do not tell scholars not to be politically engaged or only to be
politically engaged; they do not tell them to adopt liberal or conservative (or
other) political principles in their work or urge them to strive for “objectivity”
or “neutrality”; they do not, in short, tell the reader what kind of legal scholar
to be. Instead, they tell that scholar to be whatever sort of legal scholar he or
she is in an open, and open-minded, fashion, one that acknowledges and is upfront about one’s animating premises, influences, agreements and

32. See Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics, supra note 30, at 897–898.
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disagreements, goals, sources, and internal or external constraints. They give
readers—whether other law professors, scholars in other fields, or a more
general readership—the ability to judge that work more knowledgeably for
themselves. In a politically heated age in which, in so many areas and
endeavors of life, the end is so often treated as justifying the means, that
agreement is something valuable and noteworthy in itself.
Last but not least, these draft principles have value as a starting point for
further discussion. Indeed, we think that is their foremost value. There will
necessarily be disagreements about how these basic principles ought to be
applied. Given the multiple platforms and activities engaged in by law
professors—Twitter feeds, amicus briefs, congressional testimony, activism of
various stripes, and much more—there will be inevitable disagreements about
where and when they should apply. Even the basic principles themselves will
not command unanimous consent from legal scholars.
But forward movement requires movement from somewhere. It requires a
starting point, both to serve as a spur for discussion and to provide a common
vocabulary for that discussion. If it is not to be merely the proverbial discussion
about the weather, it requires some common ground in both defining the scope
of the subject and attempting to fix some tentative principles that ought to guide
our action going forward. That starting point may be imperfect, but having a
place to start from is essential.
In the individual contributions that follow, each of the symposium
participants take different—sometimes provocatively different—views about
which of these values are most important and which are most problematic, what
sorts of activities by law professors they should apply to, and of course how
they should apply. Our attempt, unusual for academic symposia such as this,
to put something specific on the table, agree on it, and share it with our
colleagues was never meant to be a final and definitive answer to the questions
that confront us concerning the ethics of legal scholarship. It was not meant to
end the discussion. But we have attempted to provide a useful place from which
to begin and continue such a discussion.
So, let us begin.

